

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

ERIC VONCHARLES MOSBY	§	
(TDCJ No. 2015880),	§	
	§	
Petitioner,	§	
	§	
V.	§	No. 3:17-cv-2241-M-BN
	§	
LORIE DAVIS, Director	§	
Texas Department of Criminal Justice	§	
Correctional Institutions Division,	§	
	§	
Respondent.	§	

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Petitioner Eric Voncharles Mosby, a Texas prisoner, filed a *pro se* application for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 concerning his Dallas County conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, in which, as amended, he asserts that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective, his guilty plea was entered under duress and incompetently, and that he was insane at the time he committed the offense. *See* Dkt. No. 11.

This resulting action has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference from Chief Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn.

The State filed a response opposing relief. *See* Dkt. No. 16. Mosby failed to file a reply brief, and the deadline to do so has passed. *See* Dkt. No. 15.

The undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should deny Mosby's request for federal habeas relief.

Applicable Background

“Mosby waived a jury and pleaded guilty to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. *See* TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a) (West 2011). After finding [him] guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at twenty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, [Mosby’s] attorney filed a brief in which he concludes the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit,” and the Dallas Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment as modified, to reflect that Mosby entered an open plea of guilty. *Mosby v. State*, No. 05-15-01391-CR, 2016 WL 3611505, at *1 (Tex. App. – Dallas June 28, 2016, no pet.); *see also State v. Mosby*, No. F14-75538-P (203d Jud. Dist. Ct., Dallas Cnty., Tex.).

While Mosby did not petition the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”) for discretionary review, he did pursue state habeas relief. *See Ex parte Mosby*, No. W14-75538-P(A) (203d Jud. Dist. Ct., Dallas Cnty., Tex.) (raising claims that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel – based on counsel’s failure to investigate his competency – and that he was incompetent to stand trial at the time he entered his plea) [Dkt. No. 20-1, Ex. A & B].

And the CCA denied his habeas application without written order on findings of trial court without hearing. *See Ex parte Mosby*, No. WR-86,583-01 (Tex. Crim. App. July 26, 2017).

Legal Standards

“Federal habeas features an intricate procedural blend of statutory and caselaw authority.” *Adekeye v. Davis*, 938 F.3d 678, 682 (5th Cir. 2019). In the district

court, this process begins (and often ends) with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), under which “state prisoners face strict procedural requirements and a high standard of review.” *Adekeye*, 938 F.3d at 682 (citation omitted). And, under AEDPA, where a state court has already rejected a claim on the merits, a federal court may grant habeas relief on that claim only if the state court adjudication:

- (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
- (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); *see Adekeye*, 938 F.3d at 682 (“Once state remedies are exhausted, AEDPA limits federal relief to cases where the state court’s decision was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ or was ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.’” (citation omitted)); *see also Allen v. Vannoy*, 659 F. App’x 792, 798-99 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (describing Section 2244(d) as “impos[ing] two significant restrictions on federal review of a habeas claim ... ‘adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings’”).

A state court adjudication on direct appeal is due the same deference under Section 2254(d) as an adjudication in a state post-conviction proceeding. *See, e.g., Dowthitt v. Johnson*, 230 F.3d 733, 756-57 (5th Cir. 2000) (a finding made by the CCA on direct appeal was an “issue ... adjudicated on the merits in state proceedings,” to

be “examine[d] ... with the deference demanded by AEDPA” under “28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)”.

And “[t]he question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable – a substantially higher threshold.” *Schriro v. Landrigan*, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); *see also Sanchez v. Davis*, 936 F.3d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[T]his is habeas, not a direct appeal, so our focus is narrowed. We ask not whether the state court denial of relief was incorrect, but whether it was unreasonable – whether its decision was ‘so lacking in justification’ as to remove ‘any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” (citation omitted)).

A state court decision is “contrary” to clearly established federal law if “it relies on legal rules that directly conflict with prior holdings of the Supreme Court or if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court on materially indistinguishable facts.” *Busby v. Dretke*, 359 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2004); *see also Lopez v. Smith*, 574 U.S. 1, 2 (2014) (per curiam) (“We have emphasized, time and time again, that the [AEDPA] prohibits the federal courts of appeals from relying on their own precedent to conclude that a particular constitutional principle is ‘clearly established.’” (citation omitted)).

A decision constitutes an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if “the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” *Williams v. Taylor*, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000); *see also Pierre v.*

Vannoy, 891 F.3d 224, 227 (5th Cir. 2018) (a petitioner’s lack of “Supreme Court precedent to support” a ground for habeas relief “ends [his] case” as to that ground).

“For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.... A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” *Harrington v. Richter*, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or ... could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” *Id.* at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted); *see also Evans v. Davis*, 875 F.3d 210, 216 (5th Cir. 2017) (recognizing that Section 2254(d) tasks courts “with considering not only the arguments and theories the state habeas court actually relied upon to reach its ultimate decision but also all the arguments and theories it could have relied upon” (citation omitted)).

The Supreme Court has further explained that “[e]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” *Richter*, 562 U.S. at 101 (internal quotation marks omitted). And “even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” *Id.* at 102. The Supreme Court has explained that, “[i]f this standard

is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be,” where, “[a]s amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings,” but “[i]t preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents,” and “[i]t goes no further.” *Id.* Thus, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” *Id.* at 103; *accord Burt v. Titlow*, 571 U.S. 12, 20 (2013) (“If this standard is difficult to meet – and it is – that is because it was meant to be. We will not lightly conclude that a State’s criminal justice system has experienced the extreme malfunction for which federal habeas relief is the remedy.” (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)).

As to Section 2254(d)(2)’s requirement that a petitioner show that the state court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” the Supreme Court has explained that “a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance” and that federal habeas relief is precluded even where the state court’s factual determination is debatable. *Wood v. Allen*, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 303 (2010). Under this standard, “it is not enough

to show that a state court's decision was incorrect or erroneous. Rather, a petitioner must show that the decision was objectively unreasonable, a substantially higher threshold requiring the petitioner to show that a reasonable factfinder must conclude that the state court's determination of the facts was unreasonable." *Batchelor v. Cain*, 682 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 2012) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court must presume that a state court's factual determinations are correct and can find those factual findings unreasonable only where the petitioner "rebut[s] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); *Gardner v. Johnson*, 247 F.3d 551, 560 (5th Cir. 2001). This presumption applies not only to explicit findings of fact but also "to those unarticulated findings which are necessary to the state court's conclusions of mixed law and fact." *Valdez v. Cockrell*, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n.11 (5th Cir. 2001); *see also Ford v. Davis*, 910 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 2018) (Section 2254(e)(1) "deference extends not only to express findings of fact, but to the implicit findings of the state court.' As long as there is 'some indication of the legal basis for the state court's denial of relief,' the district court may infer the state court's factual findings even if they were not expressly made." (footnotes omitted)).

And "determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an unreasonable legal or factual conclusion does not require that there be an opinion from the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." *Richter*, 562 U.S. at 98; *see also Pondexter v. Dretke*, 346 F.3d 142, 148 (5th Cir. 2003) ("a federal habeas court is authorized by Section 2254(d) to review only a state court's 'decision,' and not the

written opinion explaining that decision” (quoting *Neal v. Puckett*, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam)); *Evans*, 875 F.3d at 216 n.4 (even where “[t]he state habeas court’s analysis [is] far from thorough,” a federal court “may not review [that] decision de novo simply because [it finds the state court’s] written opinion ‘unsatisfactory’” (quoting *Neal*, 286 F.3d at 246)).

Section 2254 thus creates a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” *Woodford v. Visciotti*, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). To overcome this standard, a petitioner must show that “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” *Richter*, 562 U.S. at 98. That is, a petitioner must, in sum, “show, based on the state-court record alone, that any argument or theory the state habeas court could have relied on to deny [him] relief would have either been contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.” *Evans*, 875 F.3d at 217.

Analysis

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (“IAC”)

The Court reviews IAC claims, whether directed at trial or appellate counsel, under the two-prong test established in *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under *Strickland*, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the performance of his attorney fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. *See id.* at 687-88. To be cognizable under *Strickland*, trial counsel’s error must be “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by

the Sixth Amendment.” *Id.* at 687; *see also Buck v. Davis*, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775 (2017) (reaffirming that “[i]t is only when the lawyer’s errors were ‘so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed ... by the Sixth Amendment’ that Strickland’s first prong is satisfied” (citation omitted)).

The petitioner also must prove that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s substandard performance. *See Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687, 692. “This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” *Id.* at 687.

[B]ecause of the risk that hindsight bias will cloud a court’s review of counsel’s trial strategy, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.”

Feldman v. Thaler, 695 F.3d 372, 378 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 689).

“A conscious and informed decision on trial tactics and strategy cannot be the basis for constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel unless it is so ill chosen that it permeates the entire trial with obvious unfairness.” *Cotton v. Cockrell*, 343 F.3d 746, 752-53 (5th Cir. 2003). And, “[j]ust as there is no expectation that competent counsel will be a flawless strategist or tactician, an attorney may not be faulted for a reasonable miscalculation or lack of foresight or for failing to prepare for what appear to be remote possibilities.” *Richter*, 562 U.S. at 110. “The Supreme Court has admonished courts reviewing a state court’s denial of habeas relief under AEDPA that they are required not simply to give [the] attorney’s the benefit of the doubt, ...

but to affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons [petitioner's] counsel may have had for proceeding as they did.” *Clark v. Thaler*, 673 F.3d 410, 421 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Therefore, on habeas review under AEDPA, “if there is any ‘reasonable argument that counsel satisfied *Strickland*’s deferential standard,’ the state court’s denial must be upheld.” *Rhoades v. Davis*, 852 F.3d 422, 432 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting *Richter*, 562 U.S. at 105); *see also Sanchez*, 936 F.3d at 305 (“As the State rightly puts it, we defer ‘both to trial counsel’s reasoned performance and then again to the state habeas court’s assessment of that performance.’” (quoting *Rhodes*, 852 F.3d at 434)).

To demonstrate prejudice, a habeas petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 694. Thus, “the question is not whether a court can be certain counsel’s performance had no effect on the outcome or whether it is possible a reasonable doubt might have been established if counsel acted differently.” *Richter*, 562 U.S. at 111. “Instead, *Strickland* asks whether it is ‘reasonably likely’ the result would have been different,” which “does not require a showing that counsel’s actions ‘more likely than not altered the outcome,’ but the difference between *Strickland*’s prejudice standard and a more-probable-than-not standard is slight and matters ‘only in the rarest case.” *Id.* at 111-12 (quoting *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 693, 696, 697). “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” *Richter*, 562 U.S. at 112.

IAC claims are considered mixed questions of law and fact and are therefore analyzed under the “unreasonable application” standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). *See Gregory v. Thaler*, 601 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2010); *Adekeye*, 938 F.3d at 682.

Where the state court adjudicated claims of ineffective assistance on the merits, this Court must review a habeas petitioner’s claims under the “doubly deferential” standards of both *Strickland* and Section 2254(d). *Cullen v. Pinholster*, 563 U.S. 170, 190, 202 (2011); *compare Rhoades*, 852 F.3d at 434 (“Our federal habeas review of a state court’s denial of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is ‘doubly deferential’ because we take a highly deferential look at counsel’s performance through the deferential lens of § 2254(d).” (citation omitted)), *with Johnson v. Sec’y, DOC*, 643 F.3d 907, 910-11 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Double deference is doubly difficult for a petitioner to overcome, and it will be a rare case in which an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that was denied on the merits in state court is found to merit relief in a federal habeas proceeding.”).

In such cases, the “pivotal question” for this Court is not “whether defense counsel’s performance fell below *Strickland*’s standard”; it is “whether the state court’s application of the *Strickland* standard was unreasonable.” *Richter*, 562 U.S. at 101; *see also id.* at 105 (“Establishing that a state court’s application of *Strickland* was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The standards created by *Strickland* and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In other words, AEDPA does not permit a *de novo* review of state counsel’s conduct in

these claims under *Strickland*. *See id.* at 101-02. Instead, on federal habeas review of a *Strickland* claim fully adjudicated in state court, the state court's determination is granted "a deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case involves review under the *Strickland* standard itself." *Id.* at 101.

Mosby alleges here "that his trial counsel failed to do any investigation or adduce the mitigating evidence of mental illness ... prior to having him plead guilty." Dkt. No. 11 at 6; *see also id.* at 7 (asserting a lack of mitigation investigation into Mosby's background).

The state court, after obtaining an affidavit from Mosby's trial counsel, *see* Dkt. No. 20-1, Ex. B, entered detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending denial of the IAC claims, *see id.*, Ex. A. Trial counsel, who the state court found to be "a trustworthy individual" whose statements "are worthy of belief," *id.* at 5, set out the scope of his investigation into the facts of Mosby's case and his background, *see id.*, Ex. B. As summarized by the state court:

(A) [Trial counsel] had multiple interviews with Mr. Mosby concerning his cases and his legal options. Mr. Mosby understood what he was charged with and his legal options. He and Mr. Mosby were able to discuss the facts of the cases and the evidence against him. Mr. Mosby had a rational understanding of the charges against him and was able to communicate with him in a logical manner in preparing his defense.

(B) He had multiple interviews with the complainant and other family members of Mr. Mosby who advised him of Mosby's diagnosis of bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. This information was made known to the court when Mr. Mosby testified.

(C) Based on his conversations and interactions with Mr. Mosby, the complainant, and Mosby's family members, he believed Mr. Mosby to be competent.

(D) Based on all his interactions, the evidence, and information obtained by a retained private investigator, he did not believe there was any valid basis for an insanity defense.

Dkt. No. 20-1 at 6.

Particularly in light of trial counsel’s uncontroverted sworn testimony, applying the deferential *Strickland* standards – through the deferential lens of AEDPA – to the applicable state court findings and conclusions, as the Court must, Mosby has not shown that the CCA’s denial of any claim that his trial counsel’s representation violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment amounts to either “an unreasonable application of *Strickland* or an unreasonable determination of the evidence.” *Garza v. Stephens*, 738 F.3d 669, 680 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)); *see also, e.g., Rhodes*, 852 F.3d at 432, 434; *Sanchez*, 936 F.3d at 305.

II. Voluntary Guilty Plea

Mosby next argues that his guilty plea was involuntarily entered, arguing, simultaneously, that he was misled by counsel – who Mosby asserts told him he would only receive probation – and that he was mentally incompetent. *See* Dkt. No. 11 at 6.

A guilty plea is valid only if entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” *Bradshaw v. Stumpf*, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005). A plea is intelligently made when the defendant has “real notice of the true nature of the charge against him.” *Bousley v. United States*, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). And a plea is “voluntary” if it does not result from force, threats, improper promises, misrepresentations, or coercion. *See United States v. Amaya*, 111 F.3d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1997).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has identified three

core concerns in a guilty plea proceeding: (1) the absence of coercion; (2) the defendant's full understanding of the charges; and (3) the defendant's realistic appreciation of the consequences of the plea. *See United States v. Gracia*, 983 F.2d 625, 627-28 (5th Cir. 1993). These core concerns are addressed by the admonishments contained in article 26.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. *See, e.g., Ojena v. Thaler*, No. 3:10-cv-2601-P-BD, 2011 WL 4048514, at *1 & n.1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2011), *rec. adopted*, 2011 WL 4056162 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2011).

But “whether the state trial court followed the statute is nondispositive. Instead, a guilty plea will be upheld on habeas review if it is entered into knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.” *Dominguez v. Director, TDCJ-CID*, No. 6:14cv49, 2014 WL 2880492, at *3 (E.D. Tex. June 23, 2014) (citing *Montoya v. Johnson*, 226 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 2000); *James v. Cain*, 56 F.3d 662, 666 (5th Cir. 1995)).

Most applicable to the instant claim, “[t]he ‘knowing’ requirement that a defendant ‘understands the consequences of a guilty plea’ means only that the defendant understands the maximum prison term and fine for the offense charged.” *Id.* (quoting *Ables v. Scott*, 73 F.3d 591, 592 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing, in turn, *United States v. Rivera*, 898 F.2d 442, 447 (5th Cir. 1990)). That Mosby understood both is reflected in the plea agreement that he signed, *see* Dkt. No. 20-1, Ex. D, and the acknowledgments he made on the record during the plea proceeding, *see* Dkt. No. 20-1 at 19 (“THE COURT: Sir, you’ve been charged by indictment with aggravated assault/serious bodily injury/deadly weapon/family violence, a second-degree felony. The range of punishment is anywhere from 2 to 20 years confinement in the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice. You understand what you're charged with and the range of punishment? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am."); *see also, e.g., id.* at 20 ("[COUNSEL]: Your Honor, at this time, Mr. Mosby will waive reading of the indictment and enter a plea of guilty. THE COURT: Sir, your attorney has just entered a plea of guilty on your behalf. Is that your plea? THE DEFEDANT: Yes, ma'am. THE COURT: Are you entering that plea of guilty freely and voluntarily? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.").

Therefore, the state court's rejection of any claim that Mosby did not enter a voluntary guilty plea was not unreasonable.

III. Insanity

Mosby's final claim – that he was insane at the time he committed the offense – is a “nonjurisdictional challenge[] to [his] conviction’s constitutionality” and is therefore “cut off” by his failing to establish that his guilty plea is not voluntary. *E.g., Norris v. McDonough*, No. 8:06-CV-0036-T-30TBM, 2007 WL 1655617, at *6 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2007) (citing *Scott v. Wainwright*, 698 F.2d 427, 429 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Once a plea of guilty has been entered, nonjurisdictional challenges to the conviction’s constitutionality are waived, and only an attack on the voluntary and knowing nature of the plea can be sustained.” (citing *McMann v. Richardson*, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); *Bradbury v. Wainwright*, 658 F.2d 1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1981)))); *see United States v. Bendicks*, 449 F.2d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1971) (“We have held on numerous occasions that a valid guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects in the prior proceedings. We have also held that the defense of

insanity at the time of the offense is such a non-jurisdictional defect.” (citations omitted)).

Recommendation

The Court should deny the application for a writ of habeas corpus.

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

DATED: May 13, 2020



DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE